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The Role of Bilateral Defense
Agreements in Maintaining the
European Security Equilibrium
The United States has entered a period of uncertainty in its defense
security relationship with Europe. The vast changes that swept through
Eastern Europe with the democratic revolts of the past two years have
raised difficult questions about how to maintain the pre-existing Euro-
pean security equilibrium and the United States' role in the future of
European security.
In assessing the future of European and U.S. defense relations, it is
customary to address the United States multilateral relations with its
European allies, as seen either in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
("NATO") or in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
("CSCE"). The thesis of this Article, however, is that there is another
highly important aspect to the United States' role in the European
security equilibrium: the bilateral defense agreements that the United
States has with each of its European defense partners.
These bilateral defense agreements provide for the presence of U.S.
forces in Europe and the right to use certain installations for defense
activities. Each bilateral defense agreement represents the practical,
highly visible foundation for defense cooperation between the United
States and the European ally involved. Such agreements contain the
basic rules for thousands of U.S. troops in European countries, rules for
overflights and transits, rules for exercises, and rules for construction,
improvement and withdrawal from facilities. In some cases, they pro-
vide for bilateral consultative groups to discuss bilateral defense issues.
These defense agreements are expressed in legally binding terms and
therefore present an important opportunity for international law to help
fashion the security relationship with each European ally. Because these
agreements are bilateral, they can be more easily negotiated and
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amended than multilateral defense agreements and can be structured to
suit the special needs of the defense relationship between two Parties.
Part I of this Article discusses briefly the changes in Europe that
suggest a need to rethink in the 1990s the international agreements that
govern our defense relations, both multilateral and bilateral. Part II
assesses the nature of U.S. bilateral defense agreements since the Sec-
ond World War. Part III reviews the bilateral defense agreements
recently concluded by the United States with Turkey (1980), Spain
(1989), and Greece (1990). Part IV considers the future of such agree-
ments in a changing Europe.
I. Defense Agreements in a Changing Europe
For forty years, Europe was a divided continent. From the Berlin Wall,
representing the physical partition of Germany, Europe's central power,
to the emergence of two superpower-dominated alliances, NATO and
the Warsaw Pact, the Europe of the Cold War had become accepted by
most of the world as a permanent and inescapable feature of the post-
World War II era.
Whatever its faults, the post-World War II condition of Europe set-
tled into an era of stability last seen on the continent only with the Con-
gress of Vienna. In the forty years prior to the establishment of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, two devastating military conflicts
wrecked Europe's political and economic stability. In the forty years
after the establishment of NATO, peaceful, albeit tense, relations
reigned in Europe. The swift but localized Soviet interventions in Hun-
gary and Czechoslovakia were the exception and not the rule.
Suddenly, in 1989, the countries of Eastern Europe began to erupt
with political change: Communist governments placed in power and
held in place by force were overthrown by popular revolt. Borders once
guarded and strewn with barbed wire were thrown open between Hun-
gary and Austria, Czechoslovakia and Austria, and ultimately East and
West Germany. The Berlin Wall came tumbling down. By the end of
1990, East and West Germany were united in the Federal Republic of
Germany, and while Soviet troops remained stationed in Eastern
Europe, Soviet internal economic turmoil and the fragmentation of its
republics clearly revealed Soviet power in Europe to be on the decline.
With Soviet power and influence on the wane and the emergence of
a united Germany, Europe once again faces the problem of how to
maintain the security equilibrium. Troubling questions arise: Do the
existing security structures need to be discarded? What countries or
power groups pose a threat to that security? Is the Soviet Union truly
transformed? What is its future? Will ethnic or nationalist sentiments
threaten regional stability? Are other threats to security emerging in the
form of environmental degradation, terrorism, or narcotics?
As Robert Tucker points out, the unprecedented aspect of this situ-
ation is that the hegemonic conflict that previously characterized Euro-
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pean equilibrium has been settled peacefully.' Unlike the aftermath of
the First and Second World Wars, there is no vanquished foe, no armi-
stice or peace treaty to be negotiated, and no clearly defined, competing
ideologies. Into this situation must step the two key instruments of for-
eign policy: diplomacy and law. Through diplomacy the United States
and Europe can seek to identify the critical security interests common to
our nations. Through international law and institutions these mutual
interests can be set forth in binding agreements and processes that will
foster Europe's security equilibrium. In addressing these interests, two
multi-national institutions that immediately come to mind are the CSCE
and NATO.
The thirty-four nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, initially launched in 1972,2 will almost certainly play an impor-
tant role in Europe's future, most notably through its continuous pro-
cess of consultations among all of the European nations, as well as the
United States and Canada. The Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the first
major instrument of the CSCE, encompassed a wide range of agree-
ments on principles governing relations among states; measures
designed to build confidence between them; principles concerning the
free movement of people, ideas, and information; and cooperation in
cultural, economic, technical and scientific fields.3 Although the Hel-
sinki Final Act did not create legally binding obligations, it enjoys wide-
spread recognition as a politically binding document; some of its
principles are evolving into customary international law. As President
Bush stated in his address to the CSCE ministerial meeting in New York
City in October 1990, it is "in the human rights and fundamental free-
doms set down in Helsinki 15 years ago [that] we find the cause and
1. Tucker, 1989 and All That, 69 FOREIGN AFF. 93, 95 (1990).
2. Multilateral preparatory talks for the Conference began in November 1972,
but the Conference formally opened in July 1973.
3. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Final Act, August 1,
1975, 14 LL.M. 1292 (1975). The Final Act is divided into three sections or "bas-
kets" relating to (1) general principles and security issues; (2) economics, science and
technology, and the environment; and (3) humanitarian issues, dissemination of
information, and cultural cooperation. Basket I endorses a program of confidence
and security-building measures ("CSBMs") to remove some of the secrecy surround-
ing military activities. For instance, Basket I calls for prior notification of certain
military maneuvers and movements and for the exchange of observers of those
maneuvers and movements. Id at 1298-99.
The Helsinki process has been the subject of periodic reviews or follow-up meet-
ings. A follow-up Conference on Confidence-and-Security-Building Measures and
Disarmament in Europe, held from Jan. 17, 1984, to Sept. 19, 1986, produced the
Stockholm Document of Sept. 19, 1986. It, too, contains provisions on the use of
force and on notification and observation of certain military activities. 26 I.L.M. 190,
191-92 (1987). The recent Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, signed Nov.
19, 1990, 30 LL.M. 1 (1991), at the beginning of the CSCE summit meeting in Paris,
was negotiated among the 23 members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact within the
framework of the CSCE process. The CSCE meetings will continue to have an
important role in an evolving Europe.
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catalyst of . . . 'the Revolution of 1989.' -4 Before adjourning on
November 21, 1990, the CSCE members signed the Charter of Paris for
a New Europe, a document proclaiming a new order of peaceful rela-
tions among multiparty democracies with market economies. The Char-
ter established a permanent CSCE secretariat in Prague, a center for
conflict prevention in Vienna, and an office for free elections in Warsaw.
It also called for the creation of a CSCE parliamentary assembly. 5
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 6 was founded, in the first
instance, as a response to the Soviet military threat. The core of the
North Atlantic Treaty is Article 5, in which the members agree that an
attack on any one of them in Europe or North America is an attack
against them all. 7 Today, because of the perceived diminution of that
threat, NATO's role is being questioned. Nevertheless, NATO remains
the primary multilateral security arrangement for the Western alliance,
designed as a defensive arrangement to prevent and repel aggression
against its members.
Many of the norms expressed in the NATO Treaty clearly have a
place in the evolving European security equilibrium. For instance,
under Article 1 of the Treaty, the parties undertake to settle interna-
tional disputes peacefully, so that security and justice are not endan-
gered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations.8 Regional collective security arrangements such as the NATO
Treaty are recognized in Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United
Nations9 and will continue to play an important part in Europe's future.
In considering multilateral security arrangements for a Europe of
the future, it is instructive to recall that during the period that the
NATO Treaty was concluded, several European countries undertook
other multilateral security arrangements as well. The Baghdad Pact of
February 24, 1955, brought together in a mutual cooperation agreement
4. President George Bush, Remarks at the CSCE Ministerial Meeting (Oct. 1,
1990), reprinted in 1 U.S. Department of State Dispatch 154 (1990).
5. Charter of Paris for a New Europe, 30 I.L.M. 190 (1991).
6. The North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, T.I.A.S. No. 1964, 34
U.N.T.S. 243.
7. Article 5 states:
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and
consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in
exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties
so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other
Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force,
to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall
immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be ter-
minated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to
restore and maintain international peace and security. Id. at art. 5.
8. 63 Stat. 2241, 2242, T.I.A.S. No. 1964, at 2, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, 244.
9. U.N. CHARTER art. 52, 1.
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such disparate nations as the United Kingdom, Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq.
The United States became an associate member in 1958, and in 1959 the
group became the Central Treaty Organization ("CENTO").10 The
Balkan Pact of August 9, 1954, brought Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia
into an alliance of political cooperation.1 1 Just prior to the NATO
Treaty, the Brussels Treaty of 1948 established the Western European
Union ("WEU"). 12 Although many of its defense functions were trans-
ferred to NATO and its economic, cultural, and social responsibilities
were passed to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation,
the Council of Europe, and the European Community, the WEU has
retained certain functions right up to today. The tendency to group
together European nations with particular historical, economic, or polit-
ical affiliations may emerge again in a new Europe.
This Article focuses, however, not on the role of these multilateral
agreements and institutions in the future of European security, but
rather on the bilateral defense agreements, between the United States
and its European partners, which authorize the deployment of U.S.
forces and the conduct of defense activities in the agreeing country. In
order to support fundamental security objectives in Europe since the
Second World War, the United States has entered into several bilateral
agreements relating to the presence of U.S. forces and the use of
defense facilities in the territory of U.S. defense allies. Contrary to what
might be expected, neither the NATO Treaty nor the NATO Status of
Forces Agreement1 3 grants the United States a right to station or send
its military forces to the territory of other NATO countries. Rather,
Article 3 of the NATO Treaty simply provides that the Parties separately
"will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to
resist armed attack." 14 The NATO Status of Forces Agreement (com-
monly referred to as the "NATO SOFA") governs how NATO forces are
to be treated once they are in a NATO country, but it too does not grant
any stationing rights in Europe. Instead, the NATO SOFA provides that
the decision to send military forces into another NATO country and the
condition under which they will be sent will "continue to be the subject
10. Declaration Relating to the Baghdad Pact, July 28, 1958, 9 U.S.T. 1077,
T.I.A.S. No. 4084, 335 U.N.T.S. 205.
11. Three-Power Defense Treaty, Aug. 9, 1954, Yugoslavia-Greece-Turkey, 211
U.N.T.S. 237.
12. Brussels Treaty, Mar. 17, 1948, 19 U.N.T.S. 51.
13. Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the
Status of their Forces,June 19, 1951,4 U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846, 199 U.N.T.S.
67 [hereinafter NATO SOFA].
14. Article 3 states in full:
In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties,
separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and
mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity
to resist armed attack.
63 Stat. 2241, 2242, T.I.A.S. No. 1964, at 4, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, 246.
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of separate arrangements between the Parties concerned."' 5
Deployment of U.S. forces to European countries, from the begin-
ning, has been based on the consent of the host country through bilat-
eral agreements. Within a few years after the signing of the NATO
Treaty, the United States had entered into such agreements with most of
its European allies. For example, two years after NATO was founded,
the United States and Portugal concluded a bilateral executive agree-
ment on the use of military facilities in the Portuguese Azores, an archi-
pelago of islands located approximately 850 nautical miles west of
Lisbon. The United States-Portugal Defense Agreement of September
6, 1951,16 along with certain amendments and implementing agree-
ments, has served as the basic accord governing U.S. military activities in
the Azores for the past forty years: activities which primarily involve
antisubmarine warfare operations and staging and logistic support. In
the same year, defense agreements were concluded allowing U.S. forces
to use facilities in Iceland and Greenland. 17 By the Exchange of Diplo-
matic Notes of January 7, 1952, between the United States and Italy,
Italy agreed to contribute resources and facilities to fulfill its obligation
to develop and maintain "the defensive strength of the free world."'
8
Implementing agreements concluded pursuant to this Exchange of Dip-
lomatic Notes form the bilateral basis for U.S. defense activities in Italy.
Thus, from the beginning of NATO, bilateral defense agreements
have served as critical elements in the United States' participation in the
European security scheme. While there is little question that multilat-
eral institutions and agreements will serve a critical role in an evolving
Europe, the United States' role in this evolution could in large part
depend on the special relationships that it establishes with its European
partners through the vehicle of bilateral defense agreements.
15. NATO SOFA, supra note 13, 4 U.S.T. at 1794, T.I.A.S. No. 2846, at 2, 199
U.N.T.S. at 70. The language quoted appears in the Preamble.
16. Defense Agreement, Sept. 6, 1951, United States-Portugal, 5 U.S.T. 2263,
T.I.A.S. No. 3087, 237 U.N.T.S. 217. This agreement has been extended several
times: Nov. 15, 1957, 8 U.S.T. 2353, T.I.A.S. No. 3950, 303 U.N.T.S. 354; Dec. 9,
1971, 22 U.S.T. 2106, T.I.A.S. No. 7254, 851 U.N.T.S. 274;June 18, 1979, T.I.A.S.
No. 10050; and Dec. 13, 1983, T.I.A.S. No. 10838. On May 18, 1984, the Parties
signed an extensive Technical Agreement in Implementation of the Defense Agree-
ment of September 6, 1951, reprinted in STAFF OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENSE
DIVISION OF THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., REPORT
ON U.S. MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN NATO's SOUTHERN REGION FOR THE SUBCOMM.
ON EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 77
(Comm. Print 1986) [hereinafter REPORT].
17. Defense Agreement, May 5, 1951, United States-Iceland, 2 U.S.T. 1195,
T.I.A.S. No. 2295, 205 U.N.T.S. 180; Agreement Concerning Defense of Greenland,
April 27, 1951, United States-Denmark, 2 U.S.T. 1485, T.I.A.S. No. 2292, 94
U.N.T.S. 35.
18. Agreement on Mutual Security, Exchange of Diplomatic Notes, United States-
Italy, Jan. 7, 1952, 3 U.S.T. 4613, T.I.A.S. No. 2611.
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II. The Nature of Bilateral Defense Agreements
The term "bilateral defense agreement," on its face, is quite broad.
Countries can and do enter into bilateral agreements that govern mili-
tary training, arms production, arms sales, arms reduction, and other
defense-related matters, all of which could be considered "bilateral
defense agreements." Military training, arms production, and arms
sales agreements, however, are typically executed at a fairly low level
and rarely have a strong impact on the overall defense relationship
between two countries.' 9 Arms control agreements are in a class by
themselves, and while they can have a profound effect on bilateral
relations, they typically are between adversaries rather than allies. The
most significant "bilateral defense agreements" with respect to the
United States and its European allies are those involving overall defense
cooperation between the two governments, including the presence of
U.S. forces and the use of defense facilities in the host country. They
are known by a variety of names, ranging from "base agreement" to
"mutual defense cooperation agreement" to "mutual security
agreement."
What then is the content of these bilateral defense agreements? A
full-scale "base agreement" typically permits the United States to erect,
maintain, improve, and use permanent structures; to station forces on a
permanent basis; and to conduct certain military activities, such as train-
ing exercises, within the host country. More limited "access agree-
ments" authorize the use of certain host country installations for transit,
staging of forces, or prepositioning of equipment, but they do not per-
mit a permanent U.S. presence other than small, caretaker units for the
maintenance and protection of U.S. equipment and property. In even
more limited situations, where the United States is simply using a partic-
ular administrative or technical facility, for example an office building
for the forces, a standard lease may serve as the bilateral agreement.
Such an agreement is actually a contract subject to host country law
rather than to an executive agreement governed by international law.
Typically, a host country does not waive its sovereignty over the
U.S. installations and facilities on its territory. Such installations are
often referred to as "U.S. bases," but in fact, the United States has only
19. Nevertheless, these other defense agreements are important to the bilateral
defense relationship. For instance, the mutual security assistance legislation passed
by the Congress in the post-World War II era contained prohibitions on U.S. sales or
grants of defense articles to a foreign country unless that country agreed not to trans-
fer such articles to a third country without the consent of the United States. There-
fore, to allow the United States to help improve the defense of Western Europe in
the immediate post-War era, the Executive Branch entered into a series of mutual
defense assistance agreements with its European allies. See, e.g., Mutual Defense
Assistance Agreement (exchange of notes), Jan. 17, 1950, United States-Italy, I
U.S.T. 50, T.I.A.S. No. 2013, 80 U.N.T.S. 145; Agreement Relating to the Assur-
ances Required under the Mutual Security Act of 1951 (exchange of notes), Dec. 21,
1951 &Jan. 7, 1952, United States-Greece, 3 U.S.T. 4569, T.I.A.S. No. 2608, 180
U.N.T.S. 171; Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, June 30, 1955, United States-
Germany, 6 U.S.T. 6005, T.I.A.S. No. 3444, 240 U.N.T.S. 69.
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operating rights set out in the base agreement, which can be subject to
various conditions imposed by the host country. Restrictions on the use
of military installations include limits on the purposes for which U.S.
forces may be employed, the presence or use of particular types of weap-
ons, and the level of forces.
Moreover, when the United States builds new facilities or buildings
on a base, the host nation normally obtains title to the structures as soon
as they are built. For this reason, U.S. funds are expended to build or to
improve such structures only if they serve a military purpose that bene-
fits the United States forces rather than the host country alone. The
U.S. Congress has established strict control over the expenditure of
funds for such projects, requiring notification to the Congress within
sixty days in most cases and, in some cases, specific Congressional
approval. 20 Congressional oversight has prompted the negotiation of
written agreements with the host country to ensure that the U.S. pres-
ence will be permitted for long enough to provide a reasonable rate of
return on the investment and to ensure the recovery of the residual
value, if any, of facilities constructed and then abandoned by U.S. forces.
In the immediate post-World War II era, these agreements served
to normalize our relations in Europe by providing for the presence of
extensive U.S. forces in each Western European country. Most of the
early agreements were short and simple. Over time, however, the prac-
tical difficulties and political sensitivities of extensive deployments
resulted in the renegotiation, amendment, or supplementation of the
earlier agreements. As these nations sought increased military assist-
ance from the United States, they began to view the security agreements
as integral to defense procurement and modernization programs. At
times, U.S. government pledges of military or economic assistance
accompanied the facilities agreements, usually in the form of a diplo-
matic note or aide memoire from the United States to the host govern-
ment. When made, these undertakings were "best efforts" pledges,
conditioned on and subject to U.S. "constitutional procedures," i.e., the
annual authorization and appropriations process of the U.S. Congress.
The negotiation of these amendments and supplements constituted a
dynamic process in which the security relationship between the United
States and its European allies evolved and matured.
A separate element of U.S. bilateral defense agreements with Euro-
pean allies consists of those agreements, or parts of agreements, relating
to the status of forces at U.S. bases and facilities. These agreements,
commonly referred to as "SOFAs," accord certain privileges and immu-
nities to U.S. forces, their civilian component, and their dependents.
The most important provisions of these agreements typically provide
protection from local criminal and civil jurisdiction, exemptions from
taxes and customs duties, and provisions for expedited entry and exit.
Because many U.S. force members are sent overseas without their spe-
20. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2808 (1988).
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cific consent, the U.S. government must ensure that they are protected,
to the maximum extent possible, from the perils of foreign courts and
prisons. These special protections may also apply to persons and enti-
ties providing contractual services to the U.S. forces.
For Europe, generally, a multilateral, NATO-wide SOFA governs
the legal status of military personnel from one member country called
upon to serve under NATO command in another member country. 2 1 It
is the only SOFA to which the United States is a party that was con-
cluded in the form of a treaty and submitted to the U.S. Senate for
advice and consent.
The United States, however, has supplemented its rights and obli-
gations under the NATO SOFA through bilateral SOFAs with several of
its European allies, such as Denmark, Germany, Greece, Iceland, the
Netherlands, Norway, and Turkey.22
These bilateral facilities agreements and SOFAs with European
allies are usually negotiated and concluded by the U.S. as executive
agreements and not as treaties subject to the advice and consent of the
Senate. Negotiation of such agreements without Congressional
approval has been an occasional source of friction between the executive
and legislative branches. 23 Controversy over executive agreements gov-
erning military bases with Portugal and Bahrain helped prompt passage
of the Case-Zablocki Act,2 4 which requires the State Department to
transmit all international agreements to the Congress within sixty days
after their entry into force.2 5 Because these agreements neither contain
a commitment by the United States to deploy forces on behalf of
another nation, nor create new rights for those nations in the United
States, the executive branch has considered it acceptable to conclude
21. NATO SOFA, supra note 13. An agreement to cover the civilian side of
NATO was signed soon after the NATO SOFA. Agreement on the Status of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, National Representatives and International
Staff, Sept. 20, 1951, 5 U.S.T. 1087, T.I.A.S. No. 2992, 200 U.N.T.S. 3. A subse-
quent protocol to the NATO SOFA defined the status of the NATO military head-
quarters. Proposal on the Status of International Military Headquarters, Aug. 28,
1952, 5 U.S.T. 870, T.I.A.S. No. 2978, 200 U.N.T.S. 340.
22. Exchange of Notes on Status of Personnel of Military Assistance Advisory
Group and Offshore Procurement Program, Dec. 12, 1956, United States-Denmark, 9
U.S.T. 271, T.I.A.S. No. 4002; Agreement on Status of U.S. Forces, Aug. 3, 1959,
United States-Federal Republic of Germany, 14 U.S.T. 689, T.I.A.S. No. 5352;
Agreement Concerning the Status of U.S. Forces, Sept. 7, 1956, United States-
Greece, 7 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 3649; Annex to Agreement on Status of U.S.
Personnel and Property, May 8, 1951, United States-Iceland, 2 U.S.T. 1533, T.I.A.S.
No. 2295; Exchange of Notes on Stationing of U.S. Armed Forces, Apr. 13, 1954,
United States-Netherlands, 6 U.S.T. 103, T.I.A.S. No. 2950; Exchange of Notes on
Status of Military Assistance Group, Apr. 13, 1954, United States-Norway, 5 U.S.T.
619, T.I.A.S. No. 2950; Agreement on Status of U.S. Forces, June 23, 1954, United
States-Turkey, 5 U.S.T. 1465, T.I.A.S. No. 3020.
23. L. JOHNSON, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 57-70 (1984).
24. 1 U.S.C. § 112b (1988).
25. Id. See also L. MARGOLIS, EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN
FOREIGN POLICY 86-88 (1986); Executive Agreements with Portugal and Spain: Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
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them as executive agreements. Nonetheless, in some cases, there may
be non-legal reasons for heightening the political significance of the
defense relationship by establishing a treaty. 26 In international law, of
course, a treaty is no more or less legally binding than an executive
agreement.
These agreements are a key component of the United States' bilat-
eral security relationship with each of its European allies. By observing
some of the characteristics of the most recent and significant bilateral
defense agreements, one can glean a few lessons about how these
accords may develop in the future.
I1. Recent Bilateral Defense Agreements with Europe
There are too many U.S.-European defense agreements to discuss them
all in detail, but some of the recent ones concluded with key European
allies are illustrative of the issues that typically arise. They also provide
a sense of how these agreements can or should change in the future,
whenever they are renewed or renegotiated. Therefore, this section
provides a brief review of three agreements recently concluded with
Turkey (1980), Spain (1989), and Greece (1990).
A. Turkey
Turkey has been a key participant in the NATO alliance since it became
a member in 1952.27 Turkey maintains the second largest military force
of any NATO country and hosts various military installations used by
the United States and other NATO forces. There can be little question
that Turkey's geographic location gives it great strategic importance. It
borders Syria, Iraq, Iran, the Soviet Union, and Bulgaria, and highly sig-
nificant air routes and waterways lie within its control, including the
Bosporus and the Dardanelles, the gateways to the Black Sea.
Beginning in the 1950s, the United States and Turkey entered into
a number of agreements regarding mutual security and defense assist-
ance. On July 3, 1969, a Defense Cooperation Agreement 28 was signed
by the two governments to consolidate the various bilateral accords.
This Agreement governed operations at each facility in Turkey used by
the United States throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. 29
26. A good example of this is the 1976 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation
between the United States and Spain, which could just as easily have been negotiated
and concluded as an executive agreement. Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation,
Jan. 24, 1976, United States-Spain, 27 U.S.T. 3005, T.I.A.S. No. 8360.
27. Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Greece and Turkey,
Oct. 17, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 43, T.I.A.S. No. 2390, 126 U.N.T.S. 350 [hereinafter
Protocol].
28. Defense Cooperation Agreement, July 3, 1969, United States-Turkey (unpub-
lished), noted in REPORT, supra note 16, at 50.
29. When the U.S. Congress imposed an embargo on arms transfers to Turkey in
the mid-1970s in response to the conflict in Cyprus, Turkey announced that the
Defense Cooperation Agreement was no longer valid, leading to the suspension of
U.S. defense operations at Sinop, Pirinclik, Belbasi, and Karamursel for more than
Vol. 24
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Negotiations between the United States and Turkey in 1979
culminated in the conclusion of a new agreement, the Defense and Eco-
nomic Cooperation Agreement ("DECA"), which was signed on March
29, 1980.30 This bilateral defense agreement now governs the use of
military installations in Turkey by U.S. personnel and explicitly recog-
nizes the principle that "the maintenance of an adequate defense pos-
ture is an important element for the preservation of world peace and
stability." 3'
The major military facilities used by the United States in Turkey
include bases at Sinop on the Black Sea coast and Pirinclik in southeast-
ern Turkey, as well as a seismographic detection facility at Belbasi in
central Turkey. Other major facilities are located on the south-central
coast, including supply and storage depots at Yumurtalik and Incirlik Air
Base. Incirlik is the major tactical fighter base in Turkey and serves as a
key deployment platform for U.S. Air Force aircraft participating in
NATO-related missions. These aircraft are "the most forward
deployed, land-based U.S. tactical combat aircraft in the eastern
Mediterranean." 32
In addition to defense cooperation, the 1980 DECA expressly rec-
ognizes the need for cooperation between the U.S. and Turkey in the
economic sector. The preamble states that the two nations "desire to
maintain the security and independence of their respective countries
and to increase the standard of living of their peoples." s33 In Article I,
the parties agree to "maintain cooperation so as to foster their economic
and social development."'3 4 In Article II, the reason for combining
defense and economic relations is made clear: the parties recognize that
"a sound defense rests on a sound economy."'35
In Article V, Turkey authorizes the United States "to participate in
joint defense measures at specified Turkish Armed Forces installa-
tions,"3 6 and further states that defense cooperation "shall be limited to
obligations arising out of the North Atlantic Treaty."'37 Thus, unless
characterized as operations in defense of NATO, the DECA does not
envision the use of Turkish bases for U.S. military operations in areas
such as the Middle East or the Persian Gulf. On the other hand, nothing
three years. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., CON-
GRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE RELATIONS AND THE TURKISH ARMS EMBARGO 25 (Comm.
Print 198 1); Statement by Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Philip C. Habib
before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations (Sept. 15, 1976), reprinted in DEP'T ST.
BULL., Oct. 4, 1976, at 424-26.
30. Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement, Mar. 29, 1980, United
States-Turkey, 32 U.S.T. 3323, T.I.A.S. No. 9901 [hereinafter U.S.-Turkey
Agreement].
31. Id.
32. REPORT, supra note 16, at 48-50.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 3.
35. Id. at 4.
36. Id. at 5.
37. Id.
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in the DECA precludes mutual arrangements or agreements allowing
such operations so long as there is prior approval by the government of
Turkey. When the United States sought to use Incirlik Air Base inJanu-
ary 1991 to strike at Iraqi military targets, Turkish President Turgut
Ozal sought (and received) the approval of his nation's Parliament
before the United States could begin its operations.3 8
For its part, the United States agrees to "use its best efforts" to
provide Turkey with "defense equipment, services and training in
accordance with programs to be mutually agreed upon."3 9 In Supple-
mentary Agreement Number 1, the parties establish ajoint Turkish-U.S.
Defense Support Commission composed of senior Turkish and U.S. rep-
resentatives to facilitate long-range defense planning.40 Various other
supplementary agreements, implementing agreements, and annexes
detail the missions, force levels, and operations procedures for use of
the Turkish installations by U.S. forces.4 1 Of particular note is Supple-
mentary Agreement Number 3, which sets out the general guidelines
governing the use of installations in Turkey.4 2
Article VII of DECA states that the basic agreement and its supple-
mentary agreements shall remain in force for five years, after which it
will continue in force from year to year until terminated by agreement of
the parties or upon three months notice prior to the end of each subse-
quent year.43 By an exchange of letters dated March 16, 1987, the
United States and Turkey extended the initial term of the DECA for
another period of five years, until December 18, 1990.44 Thus, Turkey
and the United States could now determine at any time that they wish to
terminate the DECA, and absent a new agreement, the DECA would
expire at the end of the calendar year, so long as the notice of termina-
tion had been given by the end of the previous August. Given the
strong state of United States-Turkish relations, it is unlikely that either
party would wish to terminate the agreement, but renegotiation of the
agreement, or of one or more of its implementing agreements, is not
unlikely in the 1990s.
38. U.S. Planes Strike From Base in Turkey, Wash. Post, Jan. 19, 1991, at A23, col. 1.
39. U.S.-Turkey Agreement, supra note 30, at art. III; Supplementary Agreement
No. 1 on Defense Support, United States-Turkey, Mar. 29, 1980, 32 U.S.T. 3323,
T.I.A.S. No. 9901.
40. Supplementary Agreement No. 1 on Defense Support, supra note 39, at 7.
41. See, e.g., Supplementary Agreement No. 2 on Defense Industrial Cooperation,
with Annex, U.S.-Turkey, Mar. 29, 1980, U.S.T. 3323, T.I.A.S. No. 9901, at 10; Sup-
plementary Agreement No. 3 on Installations, with Implementing Agreements
Annexed, United States-Turkey, Mar. 29, 1980, 32 U.S.T. 3323, T.I.A.S. No. 9901, at
16.
42. Supplementary Agreement No. 3, supra note 41.
43. United States-Turkey Agreement, supra note 30, at 5.
44. Exchange of Letters, United States-Turkey, March 16, 1987 (unpublished text
on file at Cornell Int'l L.J. office).
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B. Spain
The United States bilateral defense relationship with Spain originated
with a September 1953 agreement permitting U.S. use of air and naval
bases in Spain.4 5 In turn, the United States provided military assistance
and training to Spanish forces. Various other defense agreements
between the United States and Spain were developed through the
1970s even though Spain was not even a member of NATO.
Spain formally became a member of NATO on May 30, 1982,46 and
barely two months later, Spain and the United States signed a new exec-
utive agreement on the use of Spanish bases. This agreement, the
Agreement on Friendship, Defense and Cooperation,4 7 permitted the
United States to use the Rota Naval Base and Torrejon, Zaragoza, and
Moron Air Bases as well as certain storage and communications facili-
ties. Forces deployed from these facilities were in an excellent geo-
graphic position to cover the western approaches to Gibraltar, the
western Mediterranean, and even the eastern Atlantic. Torrejon Air
Base served as the headquarters of the 16th U.S. Tactical Air Force of
the U.S. Air Forces, Europe (commonly referred to as "USAFE"). 48
In the mid-1980s, the Government of Spain expressed a desire to
renegotiate the 1983 Agreement. In November 1988, negotiations for a
new agreement, the Agreement on Defense Cooperation, were con-
cluded; the new agreement entered into force on May 4, 1989.4 9 The
new defense agreement is quite long, consisting of six chapters contain-
ing sixty-nine articles, plus eight annexes, two of which are devoted to
status-of-forces matters.
Article 2 sets the stage for the Agreement on Defense Cooperation.
In it, Spain grants to the United States the use of certain operational and
support installations and the use of Spanish territory, territorial sea and
airspace for "purposes within the bilateral or multilateral scope of this
Agreement." 50 The authorized purposes for which the U.S. may use
Spanish territory are then spelled out in subsequent articles. These
include use of facilities in Spain for "military purposes," 5 1 assignment
of U.S. forces to the installations to carry out authorized activities,
5 2
storage of ammunition and explosives,5 3 overflight and transit of air-
45. Agreement on Mutual Defense Assistance, Sept. 26, 1953, United States-
Spain, 4 U.S.T. 1876, T.I.A.S. No. 2849, 207 U.N.T.S. 87.
46. Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Spain, Dec. 10,
1981, T.I.A.S. No. 10564.
47. Agreement on Friendship, Defense and Cooperation, July 2, 1982, United
States-Spain; T.I.A.S. No. 10589.
48. See REPORT, supra note 16, at 14-15.
49. Agreement on Defense Cooperation, Dec. 1, 1988, United States-Spain
(unpublished text on file at Cornell Int'l L.J. office) [hereinafter United States-Spain
Agreement].
50. Id. at art. 2, 2.
5 1. Id. at art. 8, 1.
52. Id. at art. 22.
53. Id. at art. 23.
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craft, 5 4 aircraft training,55 and fuel storage. 56 Article 2 also provides
that any use beyond these purposes requires the prior authorization of
the Government of Spain.5 7 In addition, the parties "recognize" the
importance of maintaining military education, training, and exchange
programs for their armed forces and, when appropriate, cooperation on
programs such as funding purchases of armaments, material, and
equipment. 58
Article 7 of the Agreement on Defense Cooperation establishes a
permanent committee to ensure coordination between the parties in the
implementation of the agreement and to resolve disputes in its applica-
tion. The permanent committee is assigned various other tasks, such as
monitoring the condition of the facilities, 59 considering requests by the
United States to exceed authorized levels of forces, 60 and administering
the transfer back to Spain of installations from which the U.S. has
withdrawn.6 '
The Agreement on Defense Cooperation contains detailed provi-
sions on what happens if the U.S. withdraws from Spanish installations.
Typically, in agreements such as this, the United States is interested in
maintaining the right to remove U.S. property at the installation, while
the host government is interested in maintaining the usefulness of the
installation by having the opportunity to purchase necessary equipment,
especially if the United States considers the equipment to be in excess of
its needs. Article 19 of the Spanish Agreement reflects these concerns.
The Spanish Agreement on Defense Cooperation recognizes that
defense activities can and do have environmental implications. Article
20 states that "[t]o ensure adequate protection for the environment and
public health, the military authorities of both countries shall collaborate
with a view toward meeting the legal standards applicable to [these
installations], in particular those relating to hazardous, pollutant, and
toxic substances." 62
Most U.S. bilateral defense agreements on facilities make some ref-
erence to the status of forces, but they leave detailed provisions to a
separate SOFA. Further, these provisions usually cover only the status
of U.S. forces abroad. The Spanish Agreement on Defense Coopera-
tion, however, contains extensive provisions on both the status of U.S.
forces in Spain6 3 and the status of Spanish forces in the United States. 64
54. Id. at arts. 24-25.
55. Id. at art. 27.
56. Id. at art. 35.
57. Id.
58. Id. at art. 2, 3.
59. Id. at art. 8, 3.
60. Id. at art. 18, 5.
61. Id. at art. 19, 3.
62. Id. at art. 20, 4.
63. Id. at arts. 36-51.
64. Id. at arts. 52-67.
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The specific facilities authorized for U.S. use, known in the Agree-
ment on Defense Cooperation as "Operational and Support Installa-
tions" or "IDAs," and the authorized force level at each facility are
specified in the annexes to the agreement. These installations are under
Spanish command and the Spanish flag flies over them. 65 .U.S. forces
are commanded by a U.S. Commander and retain control over the
equipment, material, and premises used exclusively by them. 66 Each
party bears the costs of operation and maintenance of services and
installations used exclusively by that party.6 7 Where joint use occurs,
the cost is shared by the parties on a proportional basis. 68
One important aspect of the overall negotiation of the Agreement
on Defense Cooperation was that, while the use of Zaragoza Air Base,
Moron Air Base, Rota Air Base, and various communications facilities
continued to be authorized, Spain decided to withdraw its authorization
to use Torrejon Air Base and to reduce U.S. operations at Zaragoza Air
Base. This action involved extensive discussions between the parties as
to the timetable for U.S. withdrawal, the relinquishment of facilities and
property at the base, and the impact on the overall United States-Spain
defense relationship. The same issues concerning withdrawal of U.S.
forces from certain facilities were to arise shortly thereafter with the
negotiation of the new United States-Greece defense agreement.
C. Greece
Greece joined NATO on February 15, 1952.69 Shortly thereafter, on
October 12, 1953, the United States and Greece concluded a bilateral
facilities agreement. 70 This agreement authorizes the construction,
development, use and operation of "military and supporting facilities"
in Greece in "implementation of, or in furtherance of, approved NATO
plans." 7 1
On July 15, 1983, the United States and Greece concluded a
Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement,7 2 which authorized the
United States to maintain and operate several important facilities in
Greece.7 3 Under that agreement, Hellenikon Air Base, near Athens,
served as an important staging point for air transport operations of
USAFE and as a support installation for the U.S. Military Airlift Com-
mand ("MAC"). Nea Makri Communications Station on the Greek
65. Id. at art. 16, 2.
66. Id.
67. Id. at art. 20, 3.
68. Id.
69. See Protocol, supra note 27.
70. Agreement Concerning Military Facilities, Oct. 12, 1953, United States-
Greece, 4 U.S.T. 2189, T.I.A.S. No. 2868, 234 U.N.T.S. 43.
71. Id., 4 U.S.T. 2189, 2192-94; T.I.A.S. No. 2868, at 4-6; 34 U.N.T.S. 43, 46-48.
72. Agreement on Defense and Economic Cooperation, Sept. 8, 1983, United
States-Greece, T.I.A.S. No. 10814 (entered into force Dec. 20, 1983) [hereinafter
U.S.-Greece Agreement].
73. Id.
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mainland near Marathon Bay served as a key communications link for
the Sixth Fleet. On the island of Crete, Souda Bay provided an excellent
port for U.S. naval vessels operating in the eastern Mediterranean and in
need of petroleum, oil, lubricants, and ammunition. The complex also
included an outstanding airfield that permitted support for U.S. mari-
time patrol aircraft. In addition, U.S. communications facilities (such as
facilities at Iraklion, Crete) and various U.S. and NATO support sites
were scattered around Greece.74 The 1983 bilateral defense agreement
provided that the accord was terminable after five years upon written
notice by either party. Notice was to be given five months prior to the
date that the termination was to take effect. The United States was to be
given seventeen months to complete the withdrawal of its forces, prop-
erty, and equipment from Greece.
75
In 1987, the Government of Greece notified the United States that
the 1983 agreement would terminate and proposed negotiation of a new
agreement. These negotiations commenced and continued long enough
that the seventeen-month withdrawal period had to be extended to
twenty-three months. During the negotiations, the United States
decided to close down certain facilities: Hellenikon Air Base, the various
communications sites, and the Nea Makri Naval Communications com-
plex. The dates of withdrawal were staggered: from Nea Makri by Sep-
tember 20, 1989, from Hellenikon by June 30, 1991, and from the
various communications sites after commercially leased circuits neces-
sary to U.S. operations were in place. Consequently, the new agreement
was drafted to provide for the orderly withdrawal of U.S. forces from
these facilities.
This new accord, the Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement,
entered into force on November 6, 1990.76 The preamble states that
the relations of the two parties are "based on a common devotion to the
principles of freedom, democracy, human rights, justice and social pro-
gress," and that the parties are "dedicated to the maintenance of peace,
including the settlement of disputes through peaceful means." 77 In arti-
cle I, Greece authorizes the United States to maintain and operate mili-
tary and supporting facilities in Greece as specified in the agreement's
Annex in Implementation. 7 8 There are no restrictions on this authoriza-
tion, although Article VIII of the agreement preserves the right of the
Government of Greece "to take immediately all appropriate restrictive
measures required to safeguard its vital national security interests in an
74. See REPORT, supra note 16, at 35-36.
75. U.S.-Greece Agreement, supra note 72, T.I.A.S. No. 10814, at art. XII, 2.
76. Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement, July 8, 1990, United States-Greece
(unpublished text on file at Cornell Int'l L.J. office). The agreement was accompanied
by a side letter, datedJuly 8, 1990, in which the United States undertook "annually to
seek appropriate levels of defense support to assist in Greek Armed Forces moderni-
zation" (unpublished text on file at Cornell Intl L.J. office).
77. Id. at Preamble.
78. Id. at art. I, $ 1.
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emergency." 79
To see which facilities are provided under the Mutual Defense
Cooperation Agreement, one must refer to the Annex. The Annex pro-
vides for the continued use of Iraklion Communications Station for
"communications and scientific research and analysis and communica-
tion of data." 80 The Annex also authorizes continued use of Souda Air
Base for "operation, maintenance and support of United States mari-
time patrol and reconnaissance aircraft and limited conduct of technical
ground processing."8 1
Article II recognizes that the status of U.S. forces in Greece shall be
governed by the NATO SOFA, but it calls upon the parties to determine
at a later date whether the existing bilateral agreements supplementary
to the NATO SOFA need to be consolidated and modernized, in which
case the parties shall proceed to do so. 82 Article V provides for a Joint
Commission to deal with questions or differences that might arise con-
cerning the interpretation or implementation of the agreement.8 3 The
Joint Commission is also charged with reviewing all existing implement-
ing arrangements between the parties at the request of either party.
84
In addition, under Article VI, the parties agree to establish a "High-
Level Consultative Committee" to meet annually to conduct a "compre-
hensive review of their defense relationship."
85
Like the 1983 Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement, the
1990 Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement calls upon the United
States to assist in the "modernization and enhancement of the capabili-
ties of the Greek Armed Forces." 8 6 Moreover, the parties recognize
"the relationships between defense capability and economic growth and
stability" and agree to cooperate in the areas of economic, industrial,
scientific, and technological relations.
8 7
The duration of the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agree-
ment is eight years and may be extended in subsequent years if the par-
ties so agree.88 Again, the United States is provided a period of
seventeen months after expiration of the agreement to withdraw its
forces, with the terms of the agreement continuing to apply during that
period.8 9
79. Id. at art. VIII, 1.
80. Id. at Annex, 1, B.5.
81. Id.
82. Id. at art. II, 4.
83. Id. at art. V, 1.
84. Id. at art. XI, 2.
85. Id. at art. VI.
86. Id. at art. IX, 1.
87. Id. at art. X, 2.
88. Id. at art. XII, 1.
89. Id. at art. XII, 9 2.
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IV. The Future of Bilateral Defense Agreements in Europe
What can be said about the future of U.S. bilateral defense agreements
with European allies and the role of these agreements in maintaining the
European security equilibrium? U.S. forces will continue to be deployed
in Europe, albeit in smaller numbers, and bilateral agreements are
needed to secure rights and define obligations that arise from those
deployments. For that reason, bilateral agreements will retain their
vitality and will continue to serve the functions they have served for the
past forty years. These agreements will continue to have as their stated
purpose the overall defense cooperation and mutual security of the par-
ties. The agreements will continue to authorize the use of host country
installations at some level, whether for permanent stationing of forces or
for the prepositioning of equipment. Some form of joint committee or
periodic consultation will exist regarding the defense relationship.
There are, however, some issues that may be particularly prominent in
the years to come as these agreements evolve and are renegotiated,
amended, or supplemented.
First is the issue of the levels of U.S. forces that will continue to be
deployed in Europe. Both as a consequence of the Conventional Forces
in Europe Treaty and in light of the diminished Soviet threat to NATO
in Europe, U.S. forces in Europe will be substantially reduced by 1995.
Budgetary constraints also will continue to exert downward pressure on
force levels. At the same time, the U.S. plans to retain a significant pres-
ence in Europe for the foreseeable future.9 0
As the number of U.S. forces at certain facilities are decreased and
these facilities are returned to host governments, numerous questions
will arise concerning the continued functioning of the facilities under
host government control. In what crisis circumstances can the United
States renew its access to facilities from which it has withdrawn? What
kind of transition period will exist? What property will be left behind by
the United States? Will payment be made by the host government to the
United States for the "residual value" of property and improvements
funded by the United States? The provisions of existing defense agree-
ments address some of these matters already, but these issues will prob-
ably arise much more frequently in the near future than they have in the
past.9 '
90. See FY 1992-93 Budget for the Department of Defense: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Armed Services, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1991) (Statement of Dick Cheney,
Secretary of Defense).
91. For example, although the United States has succeeded in obtaining host
country agreement to pay compensation to the United States for the residual value of
facilities returned to the host government, this host country obligation has rarely
been tested. How does one assess this residual value? The Congress has made it
quite clear that it believes residual value should be paid for by the host government
upon termination of U.S. operations at military installations abroad. See National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-510, § 2921, 104
Stat. 1485 (1990). In negotiating bilateral defense agreements in the future, U.S.
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A second important issue with which U.S. bilateral defense agree-
ments will be concerned is the geographical focus of the nation's secur-
ity relations. The mission of NATO has historically been to contain the
Soviet Union (and Warsaw Pact) threat, and bilateral defense agree-
ments were negotiated and concluded in that context. But it is in the
United States' interest that bilateral defense agreements contain suffi-
cient flexibility to address "out of NATO area" concerns. The recent
war against Iraq is an excellent example of the need for such flexibility.
During the crisis, the United States and its allies drew extensively on
supplies and personnel located in Europe to sustain U.S. forces in the
Middle East, and our European allies granted permission for extensive
overflights and temporary basing rights to the United States. We must
continue to be in a position to project military power by moving person-
nel and equipment from European facilities (as well as from the United
States) to the scene of the crisis quickly and in sufficient numbers to
determine the outcome. Assembling a fighting force at distant locations
requires ready, mobile forces and an appropriate mix of airlift, sealift,
and forward-positioned equipment stocks. Bilateral defense agreements
that are narrowly drafted to reflect security threats to NATO from the
former Eastern bloc could impede U.S. ability to respond quickly and
effectively to other security threats.
A third issue is the evolving nature of the U.S. security assistance
relationship with its European allies. Once again, U.S. budget con-
straints and the diminishing Soviet threat are altering the ability and the
need for the United States to provide large amounts of funding for arms
and technology sales to some of the countries with which it has defense
relationships. Although existing defense agreements do not directly
correlate authorization to deploy forces with continued U.S. security
assistance funding, the two as a matter of practice have often gone hand
in hand. As levels of U.S. funding decrease and allies assume more and
more of their burdensharing responsibilities, U.S. bilateral defense
agreements should continue to separate the presence of U.S. forces in
Europe from the need for U.S. security assistance funding. At least in
the short term, declining U.S. funding can be off-set with the distribu-
tion or "cascading" to allies of equipment that the United States must
dispose of under its Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty obliga-
tions. 92 Likewise, the United States may be able to dispose of excess
defense articles to its allies at little or no cost in the event that it with-
draws from certain facilities. While U.S. security assistance policy recog-
nizes that improvement of the military capabilities of recipient nations
enhances overall NATO security, in the long term the recipient nations
should be able to provide more fully for their own defense, particularly
at a time of declining threat. Economic aid to NATO allies will also
decline in coming years and should similarly be decoupled from U.S.
officials must assess carefully issues such as these in light of potential U.S. troop
withdrawals.
92. Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, supra note 3.
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defense relations. This approach does not preclude recognizing that
economic cooperation may be an aspect of defense cooperation, but
rather it postulates that whatever the level of cooperation, it be accom-
plished on principles of reciprocity or mutual benefit.
A fourth issue that future bilateral defense agreements will need to
address is the overall scope of "security" threats. The primary emphasis
of our bilateral defense agreements in the Cold-War era has been on
military attack, conventional or nuclear, against Europe. Thus, these
agreements have focused on deployment of forces, training, and use of
facilities in the context of military conflict. There are, however, other
types of threats to U.S. security interests that we are only beginning to
appreciate. For instance, the use of American and British forces to set
up refugee bases in Northern Iraq suggests that NATO forces must be
capable of responding to a variety of crises besides actual armed
conflict.
Another example of the need to refocus bilateral agreements is the
high-priority national security mission of U.S. armed forces to detect
and counter the production and trafficking of illegal drugs. Domesti-
cally, the Department of Defense has addressed this problem by estab-
lishing an effective communications network for federal, state, and local
law enforcement agencies, and by enhancing operational detection and
monitoring capabilities. 93 Internationally, and particularly in Latin
America, the Department of Defense is working with host governments
to interdict drugs before they reach U.S. borders. Moreover, Congress
recently proposed the establishment of a multilateral, counter-drug
strike force.9 4 Depending upon how the supply of drugs to the United
States evolves, and upon how destructive the drug problem becomes for
Europe, narcotics trafficking may be a threat that the U.S. wishes to
address further in its relations with European allies.
Likewise, the spread of international terrorism poses a threat to the
United States and Europe. Deterring such attacks on citizens and prop-
erty and responding effectively to them when they occur is an existing
mission of U.S. forces and could serve as an area of greater defense
cooperation with European armed forces.
Although the environment has not traditionally been considered an
aspect of a country's national security, the extensive environmental
destruction throughout Europe, particularly Eastern Europe, may
prompt calls for devoting greater resources, including military
resources, to combating environmental degradation. The idea of using
military resources in such a manner is already at work in the United
States with recent legislation requiring the Secretary of Defense to
establish a "Strategic Environmental Research and Development Pro-
93. See Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. 7-8 (1991) (Statement of Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff)
(unpublished text on file at Cornell Int'l L.J. office).
94. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-
510, §§ 1001-1011, 104 Stat. 1485 (1990).
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gram." 95 The purposes of this program include assisting in the collec-
tion of environmental data and identifying research, technology, and
other information developed by the Departments of Defense and Energy
that would be useful to governmental and private organizations involved
in the development of energy and pollution control technology. Were
such a program to be expanded to involve cooperation by U.S. forces
abroad with host country forces and environmental groups, the bilateral
defense agreement would be a logical place to set down the basic rules
and principles to govern such cooperation.
V. Conclusion
The United States bilateral defense agreements with its European allies
have been an important component of its security relationship with
Europe since the Second World War. These agreements initially were
short agreements concerned primarily with cooperation within the con-
text of NATO's mission to contain the Soviet Union in the event of
armed conflict. As time went by, these agreements evolved to cover the
variety of issues that arise under normal, peacetime cooperation in
defense relations, and even included economic cooperation in some
cases.
As Europe evolves and the security threats to Europe and the
United States are redefined, attention should not be given just to multi-
lateral arrangements for maintaining a security equilibrium, but to bilat-
eral defense agreements as well. These bilateral agreements are time-
tested instruments for involvement of the United States in European
defense relations and, unlike multilateral arrangements, have a great
capacity for flexibility and adaptability to the particular bilateral rela-
tionship of the two countries concerned. Whether the Soviet threat is
truly diminished, whether other countries threaten European security,
whether ethnic or nationalist sentiments threaten regional stability, and
whether other European security threats emerge, the instrument of the
bilateral defense agreement allows the United States to continue playing
a key role in European security.
95. Id. at §§ 1801-02.

